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MARITAL EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES IN MINNESOTA
Courts have long recognized the rights of husband and wife to
limit evidentiary disclosures in court by their spouses. The incom-
petency of one spouse at common law to testify for or against the
other spouse in an action in which the other spouse was a party'
was probably an outgrowth of the common law rule preventing
interested persons from testifying 2 and of the concept of the identity
of husband and wife.a This incompetency extended even to criminal
prosecutions. 4 The common law tribunals also restrained disclosure
of communications between the spouses.5 Waiver of these dis-
qualifications was not permitted ;6 however, exceptions based upon
-necessity" were recognized, particularly in cases of crimes of per-
sonal violence against the wife.7
Although some of the common law bases have been abandoned
the privilege exists today, the policy supporting it being the public
interest in preserving domestic tranquility. To obtain full disclosure
of facts for purposes of effective adjudication, the privilege as it
stood at common law has been restricted by statutes. Because the
statutes of other states vary, inquiry here will be limited to the
Minnesota decisions. Since the Minnesota statute has not been sub-
stantially changed from the date of its adoption, the rules and
reasons of the earlier decisions remain unimpaired except as mod-
ified by changed judicial attitudes.
Several variances from the common law may be found in Min-
nesota. The disqualification of interested parties, including that of
married persons, no longer exists, having been removed by a gen-
1. See State v. Frey, 76 Minn. 526, 528, 79 N.W. 518 (1899) ; Cham-
berlayne, Evidence § 1155 (1919) ; 5 Jones, Evidence § 2129 (2d ed. 1926);
3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 226 (1935) ; Hutchins and Slesinger,
Somne Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 Mim. L.
Rev. 675 (1929).
2. See National German-American Bank v. Lawrence, 77 Minn. 282,
284, 79 N. W. 1016 (1899) ; Note, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 298 (1950); 36 Iowa
L. Rev. 154 (1950). Wigmore states that the bases of the privilege are un-
certain, 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2227 (3d ed. 1940) ; 2 id. § 601.
3. See National German-American Bank v. Lawrence, 77 Minn. 282,
284, 79 N. W. 1016 (1899) ; 5 Jones, Evidence § 2129; Note, 3 Vand. L. Rev.
298 (1950) ; 18 Minn. L. Rev. 893 (1934) ; 36 Iowa L. Rev. 154 (1950).
4. Chamberlayne, Evidence § 1155; 5 Jones, Evidence § 2132; 18 Minn.
L. Rev. 893 (1934) ; 48 Mich. L. Rev. 546 (1950).
5. See Leppla v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 35 Minn. 310, 311, 29 N. W.
127, 128 (1886) ; 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 586; Note, 32 Minn. L.
Rev. 262, 264 (1948).
6. See Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209, 222 (U.S. 1839) ; see 11 Minn.
L. Rev. 575 (1927).
7. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2239 (discusses varying types of crimes
against spouse); 48 1Mich. L. Rev. 546 (1950).
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eral competency statute ;8 furthermore, the legal identity of husband
and wife has been severedP Despite the jettisoning of these concepts,
their influence has not been completely eradicated, as the court
has several times stated that the Minnesota statute creating the
marital privileges and exceptions to them is a codification of the
common law.10
The abrogation of the common law testimonial disqualification
of spouses in Minnesota results in a general competency of husband
and wife and subjects them to the ordinary obligation of witnesses
to disclose all facts within their knowledge." However, the public
interest in obtainig all relevant evidence is limited by the statutory
privilege, which consists of a right of one spouse to prevent the
other from testifying for or against the former without the former's
consent and a general privilege to have confidential communications
excluded. 2
I. THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST ADVERSE TESTIMONY
Several reasons advanced for the rule preventing one spouse
from testifying against the other without the other's consent are:
the fear of marital discord if such testimony is required :13 the
danger that secretive behavior between the spouses might result
from requiring disclosure ;14 and the notion that incrimination by
one spouse of his consort is analogous to self-incrimination. 5 Wrig-
more notes that the reasons presently advanced are the protection
of marital peace and the avoidance of one spouse's being an in-
strument of the condemnation of the other.' 6 The Minnesota court
has adopted the reasoning that marital harmony must be pro-
tected to avoid family strife which would weaken the social struc-
ture of the community.'
7
8. Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949).
9. Minn. Stat. § 519.01 (1949) ; Note, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 262, 264 (1948).
10. See State v. Feste, 205 Minn. 73, 74, 285 N. W. 85, 86 (1939) ;
Gjesdahl v. Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 420, 221 N. W. 639, 641 (1928) ; State
v. Frey, 76 Minn. 526, 528, 79 N. W. 518, 519 (1899) ; State v. Armstrong,
4 Minn. 335 (251), 342 (259) (1860).
11. See Cafritz v. Koslow, 167 F. 2d 749, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1948); 8
Wigmore, Evidence § 2192. For a comparison of the English rules of com-
petency and compellability see Phipson, Evidence 443 (8th ed., Burrows,
1942).
12. Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1549).
13. Note, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 298 (1950) ; 18 Minn. L. Rev. 893 (1934).
14. Note, 3 Vand.-L. Rev. 298, 299 (1950).
15. Ibid.
16. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 228. Note the difference between the present
reasons advanced for the privilege and earlier bases. See Hutchins and Slesin-
ger, supra note 1, at 675.
17. See State v. Feste, 205 Minn. 73, 74, 285 N. W. 85, 86 (1939).
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The statutory provision excludes testimony against one spouse
by the other unless there is consent by the first. s Written state-
ments of a spouse, as well as oral testimony, may be excluded under
this privilege.19 A possible exception to the privilege arises where
the spouses are co-parties to the action, for an admission against
interest by one spouse will be admitted over the objection of the
other.20 Testimony by the wife of a defendant to a criminal prose-
cution is inadmissible even though they are separated and a divorce
is then pending.2' If family harmony is the primary basis for the
privilege, then such a result is questionable, depending on the
weight to be accorded the possibility of reconciliation. Where the
spouses are legally divorced, the idea of protecting family harmony
is anomalous, and courts have allowed adverse testimonyY2
If in a multi-party suit one spouse testifies neither for the other
spouse nor for a party opposing him but rather for a co-party of
the spouse, a problem arises whether such testimony, which may
be favorable or at least not unfavorable, can be excluded. The ob-
jection of the party spouse might be motivated by fear of possible
adverse testimony on cross-examination or of the detrimental effect
of the spouse's demeanor. The language of the statute, referring to
testimony "for or against,' '23 would appear to dictate a very broad
privilege, which might require exclusion of such testimony.
II. PRMLEGED COMMUNIqATIONS
The policy grounds supporting the well-recognized privileged
communications doctrine include the preservation of the marital
relationship through the avoidance of family dissension, 24 the en-
couragement of confidence between spouses25 and the avoidance of
perjury.26 To be balanced against these is the argument that the
extent of actual reliance upon these rules is uncertain and may
not be extensive.27 Its critics notwithstanding, the privilege is
18. Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949).
19. Halbert v. Pranke, 91 Minn. 204, 97 N. W. 976 (1904).
20. Kanne v. Kanne, 119 Minn. 265, 138 N. VWJ. 25 (1912).
21. Sec State v. Kampert, 139 Minn. 132, 139, 165 N. W. 972, 975(1918).
22. See note 48 infra.
23. Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949).
24. Note, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 262, 264 (1950).
25. 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 226 (author recognizes this as
one reason that is given but criticizes its validity) ; 8 Wigmore, Evidence §
2332; 34 Minn. L. Rev. 257 (1950).
26. Note, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 262, 264 (1948).
27. 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 589; Hutchins and Slesinger,
.upra note 1, at 682. The latter also observe that marital harmony among
attorneys does not appear to be noticeably higher by virtue of their knowledge
of the privilege. Ibid.
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generally upheld throughout the United States .2  The Minnesota
statute expressly provides that the privilege extend to "any com-
munication made by one to the other during the marriage."-"' The
privilege is usually considered to include not only oral declarations
between spouses but writings as well."0
The intent that the disclosure remain confidential is often con-
sidered an element of the privilege. 31 Such intent might be indi-
cated by the manner of disclosure or by the subject matter. Wig-
more agrees that the element of confidentiality should be required,
and he suggests a presumpticn of confidentiality attaching to com-
munications between husband and wife, subject to a contrary show-
ing.32 The Minnesota court has taken the position that all com-
munications are privileged whether confidential by nature or not.:,
The court reasoned that to decide whether a communication was
confidential would result in the harm which the statute was in-
tended to prevent. 34 However, the court suggested the possibility
that the wife's being an agent for her husband in the conduct of
business might give rise to an exception to the privilege. - The
policy of including within the privilege nearly every communica-
tion may be questionable, but, admittedly, drawing the line is
difficult. In a later decision, the court again indicated by dictum
the possibility that certain communications might be outside the
scope of the privilege if their nature indicated an intent to have
them publicized. 36 Making a disclosure in the presence of third
persons would seem to indicate such intent.37
Though it is possible to consider acts by one spouse in the
presence of the other as confidential communications, 38 there is a
conflict of state authority as to whether such acts constitute com-
munications within the privilege.3" The WNVigmorian view is that
28. 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 587; Note, 3 Vand. L. Rev.
298, 299 (1950).
29. Minn. Stat § 595.02 (1949).
30. Chamberlayne, Evidence § 1166, 5 Jones, Evidence § 2146.
31. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2336; see 34 Minn. L. Rev. 257 (1950).
32. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2336.
33. Leppla v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 35 Minn. 310, 29 N. W. 127
(1886).
34. Id. at 311, 29 N. W. at 128.
35. Id. at 312, 29 N. W. at 128.
36. See Newstrom v. St. Paul & Duluth R. R., 61 Minn. 78, 83, 63 N. W.
253, 254 (1895).
37. See Chamberlayne, Evidence § 1166; 5 Jones, Evidence § 2145;
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2336.
38. 5 Jones, Evidence § 2144.
39. 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 587; 34 Minn. L. Rev. 257(1950) ; 36 Iowa L. Rev. 154 (1950) ; 35 Va. L. Rev. 1111 (1949) ; 26
Wash. L. Rev. 62 (1951).
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acts as such are generally not within the scope of privilege com-
munications except in special cases where the act is done for the
purpose of making a disclosure to the other.40 The Minnesota court
has not yet decided the point, 4 but if the court construes acts to
be communications, the fact that it does not require confidentiality
for the privilege to apply might lead to an extreme broadening of
the privilege, causing it to extensively overlap the privilege to
exclude adverse testimony.
III. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE IARITAL PRIVILEGES
There are significant distinctions between the privilege to pre-
vent adverse testimony by the spouse and the privilege accorded
confidential communications. The doctrine of privileged communi-
cations may be invoked by a spouse whether a party to the action
or not,42 while the privilege to prevent adverse testimony by the
spouse applies primarily where the spouse is a party.43 Further-
more, the privilege against adverse testimony applies to knowledge
however acquired, not only to communications. 44
The doctrine of privileged communications does not extend to
communications made prior to the marriage45 nor to those sub-
sequent to the termination of the marriage. 46 The privilege con-
tinues even after death or divorce has terminated the marriage,47
while that of preventing adverse testimony is co-extensive with
the duration of the marriage.48 Minnesota has conformed to this
view, sustaining, after the death of one spouse, the exclusion of
privileged statements made by that spouse,49 and quite naturally
has reached the same result where there were both death and
divorce. 0
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGES
Certain exceptions to the marital evidentiary rights have long
40. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2337.
41. But see Tousley v. First Nat. Bank of Pine City, 155 Minn. 162,
193 N. W. 38 (1923), where the court allowed testimony as to acts but ap-
parently did not consider whether acts could constitute communications.
42. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2334.
43. 8 id. § 2234.
44. 8 id. § 2334.
45. S id. § 2335; Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949).
46. Chamberlayne, Evidence § 1166; Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949).
47. Chamberlavne, Evidence § 1166; 5 Jones, Evidence § 2143; 35 Va.
L. Rev. 1111 (1949).
48. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2237.
49. Beckett v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n, 67 Minn. 298, 69
N. W. 923 (1897); see Gjesdahl v. Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 420, 221 N. W.
639, 641 (1928) - Bunker v. United Order of Foresters, 97 Min. 361, 363,
107 N. XV. 392, 393 (1906).
50. In re Estate of Osbon, 205 Minn. 419, 286 N. W. 306 (1939).
19521
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
been recognized, the common law basis of these exceptions being
the "necessity" of allowing spousal testimony in certain limited
cases. 5' The Minnesota statute52 excludes from the operation of
the marital privileges the following classes of cases:
(1) ". . . a civil action or proceeding by one against the
other. .. ";
(2) ". . . a criminal action or proceeding for a crime com-
mitted by one against the other.. ."; and
(3) ". . . an action or proceeding for abandonment and neglect
of the wife or children by the husband. .. ."
Weighing against the policy behind the marital privileges are
arguments for allowing spouses to testify against each other in
cases of personal injuries or crimes committed by one spouse upon
the other. It is urged that the wife should not be left entirely at the
mercy of the husband,53 because, as Chamberlayne argues, 4 fre-
quently personal violence by one spouse to the other would be done
under such circumstances as to make testimony by a third person
virtually impossible. Marital harmony as a basis for sustaining the
privileges is normally lacking in such cases, or, as our court has
described it, there is a general lack of cordial relations."
The problem also arises whether so-called moral injuries
against the wife may be considered within the meaning of the ex-
ception to the privileges. In the early case of State v. Armstrong
the court stated by way of dictum that the wife of a defendant
could not testify against her husband in a prosecution for adultery. 0
The conclusion that adultery was not within the exception encom-
passing crimes against the wife was based upon the reasons that the
crime was capable of being proved without her testimony and that
this was not a crime against her person, there being no violence to
or abuse of her.5 7 The language of the Armstrong case was later
followed in State v. Lasher,5s which held that in an adultery prose-
51. 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 587; 8 Wigmore, Evidence §
2239; 30 B. U. L. Rev. 135 (1950).
52. Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949).
53. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2239; 48 Mich. L. Rev. 546 n. 2 (1950). The
Minnesota court referred to the necessity for the exception to the privilege
in State v. Armstrong, 4 Minn. 335 (251), 342 (258) (1860).
54. Chamberlayne, Evidence § 1155.
55. See State v. Feste, 205 Minn. 73, 76, 285 N. W. 85, 87 (1939).
56. See State v. Armstrong, 4 Minn. 335 (251), 342 (259) (1860).
57. Ibid. In a prosecution of a third party for adulterous relations with
the witness' spouse, the court allowed the witness to testify. State v. Vollander,
57 Minn. 225, 58 N. W. 878 (1894).
58. 131 Minn. 97, 154 N. W. 735 (1915); see State v. Marshall, 140
Minn. 363, 365, 168 N. W. 174, 175 (1918).
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cution of both wrongdoers the wife of one of the defendants should
be excluded as a witness.
Several writers argue with considerable force that moral in-
juries to the spouse should be included within the exception be-
cause not really distinguishable from physical injuries and inclu-
sion would not detract from marital harmony. 9 Such reasoning
has much merit, in spite of practical difficulties in ascertaining the
various classes of cases to be embraced by the enlarged category
of exceptions. However, the possibility of condonation and the
continuance of marital harmony suggests instances in which the
injured spouse might desire not to testify. Perhaps it might be
desirable to grant only to the witness spouse the privilege to re-
frain from testifying. In any event, the Minnesota court up to the
present has not evidenced any tendency to expand on its own
initiative the scope of the exception. 60
An additional problem is whether privileged communications
may be disclosed in a civil suit between spouses. Wigmore con-
tends that to preclude the disclosure of privileged communications
essential to the case would reach harsh results. 61 A literal inter-
pretation of our statute would, in such suits, exclude from the
privilege not only adverse spousal testimony but also privileged
communications. However, in spite of the existence of the suit
between spouses, still remaining is the policy of freely inducing
marital disclosures without fear of later revelation.62
Special circumstances are present in suits for alienation of
affections. Although these are not actually suits against the mate,
certain of his interests, such as reputation, might be affected. How-
ever, the spouse bringing the suit may give testimony reflecting
upon the non-party spouse.63 In such a suit the privilege against
adverse marital testimony prevents the non-party spouse from
testifying against the party spouse, 4 and the latter may not dis-
close privileged communications of the former to him.65
59. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2239(3) ; 48 Mich. L. Rev. 546 (1950).
60. See State v. Marshall, 140 Minn. 363, 365, 168 N. W. 174, 175
(1918).
61. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2338.
62. See note 25 supra.
63. Lockwood v. Lockwood, 67 Minn. 476, 70 N. V. 784 (1897).
64. Huot v. Wise, 27 Minn. 68, 6 N. W. 425 (1880).
65. Gjesdahl v. Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 221 N. W. 639 (1928). Use of
the masculine gender throughout this Note is generally intended to include
also the feminine. Cf. Minn. Stat. § 645.08(2) (1949).
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V. WHO MAY ASSERT THE PRIVILEGES
A. Who Is a Spouse
Only legally married individuals are included within the scope
of the privileges and ordinarily the testimony of mistresses and of
second wives of bigamists are not within the area of protectionY
For purposes of invoking the privilege against adverse testimony, it
is sufficient that the woman is the wife of the party at the time of
the action, and testimony as to events prior to the marriage, even
including crimes against each other, will be excluded. 7 In the
case of privileged communications the court looks to whether the
woman was the wife of the communicator at the time the communi-
cation was made. Communications arising before or after the mar-
riage relation are not privileged as communications between
spouses.6'
B. Privilege Against Adverse Testimony
The statutory grant of the privilege against adverse marital
testimony is contained in the words: "A husband cannot be exam-
ined for or against or his wife without her consent, nor a wife for
or against her husband without his consent . . .61' A question
naturally arises whether the privilege belongs to the marital party,
to the marital witness or to both, a problem expressly covered by
statute in some other states.7 0 The issue arises when one spouse is
a party and the adversary calls the other spouse as a witness, the
party spouse consenting and the witness spouse objecting, though
this would seem to be an unusual case.
Among the applicable policy reasons suggested by Wigmore is
the desire to prevent the ill will of the party spouse toward the
witness spouse, 7' though this reason does not have much practical
persuasive force in the situation where the party spouse has al-
ready consented. On the other hand, Wigmore advances as a more
cogent ground the recognition of a witness' refusal to become an
unwilling instrument of condemnation of her spouse. He indicates
that the few American courts that have passed upon this question
have tended to grant the privilege to the witness. Nevertheless, the
precise wording of the statute would leave a Minnesota court faced
66. See Chamberlayne, Evidence § 1155; 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2230
(mistresses), 2231 (bigamous spouses).
67. State v. Feste, 205 Minn. 73, 285 N. W. 85 (1939) ; State v. Frey,
76 Minn. 526, 79 N. W. 518 (1899).
68. See notes 45 and 46 supra.
69. Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949).
70. 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 584-585; Note, 3 Vand. L. Rev.
298, 299 n. 13 (1950).
71. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § :2241.
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with such a case relatively little choice but to deny the privilege to
the witness spouse where the party spouse has previously con-
sented to the testimony. The desirability of this result is question-
able, for in some cases it may force one spouse to choose between
incriminating the other or committing perjury, where the other
consents for the purpose of obtaining his spouse's false testimony.72
Of course, when a witness spouse seeks to assert the privilege
and the other spouse is neither a party nor otherwise interested,
the court will deny the privilege.73 Likewise, the non-interested




The question whether the privilege to exclude communications
belongs exclusively to the communicator is answered affirmatively
by Wigmore, with the exception that the communicatee may assert
the privilege in the extraordinary situation where his silence might
be understood as an assent and an "adoption of the statement" of
the communicator and therefore a communication itself.75 One
Mlinnesota case, in upholding an exercise of the privilege, used
language which might indicate that either communicator or com-
municatee might object to the revelation of privileged communica-
tions.76 Further, the spouse's privilege would be recognized whether
or not he was a party to the action, and even in the absence of
affirmative objection by him.7 7 The wording of the statute is:
"... nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, without
the consent of the other, be examined as to any communication
made by one to the other during marriage. . . ,,1s A comparison of
the wording of this section with that of the subsequent sections
dealing with attorney-client, doctor-patient and clergyman-penitent
privileges discloses that the latter sections explicitly place the exer-
cise of the privilege in one specified person. It is possible therefore
to conclude that the privilege against disclosure of privileged com-
munications extends to either the communicator or the communi-
72. Wigmore contends that the rarity of a husband who would thus
expect his wife to perjure herself does not justify a "rule of universal de-
privation." 2 id. § 601.
73. Evans v. Staalle, 88 Minn. 253, 92 N. W. 951 (1903).
74. See Leonard v. Green, 30 Minn. 496, 501, 16 N. W. 399, 400 (1883).
75. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2340.
76. See Gjesdahl v. Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 420, 221 N. W. 639, 641
(1928) (the communicator's privilege was the one in fact recognized) ; see
alco Leppla v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 35 Minn. 310, 311, 29 N. W. 127, 128
(1886) ; Leonard v. Green, 30 Minn. 496, 501, 16 N. W. 399, 400 (1883).
77. Gjesdahl v. Harmon, supra note 76, at 420, 221 N. W. at 641.
78. Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949).
19521
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
catee. However, the use of "either" might be construed to mean
merely that the privilege may be asserted by either husband or wife.
D. Claim of Privilege by Third Persons
Generally the privileges to withhold testimony are personal to
the witness and are not primarily designed for the benefit of liti-
gants.79 Where neither husband nor wife are interested parties
to the action both may generally testify, in spite of sharp clashes
or conflicts of testimony.s0 According to one case, privileged com-
munications may not be disclosed even in suits to which the spouse
possessing the privilege is not a party,$' though perhaps the ob-
jection may not be made by the third party.8 2 Despite uncertainty
in some phases of the problem it seems clear that when one spouse
is called upon to testify against the interest of the other spouse
who is not a party, both husband and wife may waive the privilege
irrespective of the wishes of the third party. 3 There is not much
case authority to indicate the result when a spouse asserts a marital
privilege in an action between third parties, though it appears that
there is a probable protectiorn of such a spouse to the extent of
privileged communications."s
VI. EXERcISE OF THE PRIVILEGES
A. Which Rulings on the Privileges May be Appealed
There is little helpful Minnesota authority on the problem of
which rulings on the privileges may be appealed. Wigmore states
the general rule that there may be an appeal from a wrongful
sustaining of the privilege, as that keeps out evidence which was
entitled to be admitted and is detrimental to the objector. s5 He ex-
presses the further view that a wrongful denial of the privilege
should not be grounds for appeal, for it has the effect of increasing
the amount of relevant evidence and does not render the verdict un-
trustworthy. He admits that the majority of the courts adjudicat-
ing this question have adopted the contrary view, relying on what
he terms a "sporting theory," that litigation must be won or lost
according to the rules of the game. However, if wrongful denial of
the privilege could not be asserted as grounds for appeal, a trial
court could always be "safe" by denying the privilege.
79. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2196.
80. 5 Jones, Evidence § 2135; Hutchins and Slesinger, supra note 1, at
675. Jones qualifies this proposition by saying that this rule does not apply
if the evidence directly charges the witness spouse with an indictable offense.
81. Gjesdahl v. Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 221 N. W. 639 (1928).
82. Sommerfeld v. Griffith, 173 Minn. 51, 216 N. W. 311 (1927).
83. 8 WVigmore, Evidence § 2241.
84. See Gjesdahl v. Harmon, 175 Minn. 414, 420, 221 N. W. 639, 641
(1928).




At common law it was not possible to waive the incompetency
to testify for or against the spouse, because the doctrine of waiver
is applicable only to privileges.8 The statute expressly requires the
consent of one spouse to testimony for or against him, and it
further requires consent to the disclosure of confidential com-
munications.8 7 In effect, this consent operates as a waiver of the
privileges. Waiver may also be accomplished by an extra-judicial
disclosure or by an act which places the spouse in such a position
that he cannot validly object to further testimony upon that point.88
A common form taken by the waiver of the privilege at trial is the
failure properly to object to adverse testimony at the time the
spouse is called to the stand 9 or when disclosure of a privileged
communication is requested. Presumably husband and wife marital
privilege waivers will be restricted to cases in which the person
waives his rights with some degree of knowledge of the applica-
bility of the privileges. 0
"Wigmore states that when the spouse of a party is called to the
stand to testify for that party there is a waiver of privileges, be-
cause it would be unfair to let one side use the spouse and then
preclude cross-examination of that testimony.9 ' The Minnesota
court has adopted this rule, 2 and the court indicated that such
cross-examination might include any material relevant to the issue
of the case regardless of the scope of the direct examination. 3
This conclusion was premised on the theory that it would not be
fair to use the spouse only as to favorable matters and then to
withdraw the consent as to unfavorable information. The court
expressly limited the scope of the waiver as not including privi-
leged communications which are not the subject of direct examina-
tion .f
C. Effect of Statutory Cross-examination
Statutory cross-examination of one's adversary is a well-estab-
86. See Stein v. Bowman, 13 Pet. 209, 222 (U.S. 1839) ; see 5 Jones,
Evidence § 2137; 11 Minn. L. Rev. 575 (1927).
87. Minn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949).
88. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2340.
89. 8 id. § 2242.
90. Cf. Ross v. Great Northern Ry., 101 Minn. 122, 126, 111 N. W.
951, 953 (1907).
91. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2242.
92. State v. Stearns, 184 Minn. 452, 238 N. W. 895 (1931) ; National
German-American Bank v. Lawrence, 77 Minn. 282, 287, 80 N. W. 363(1899).




lished procedure in Minnesota. 5 Even though both spouses are
defendants in an action, however, the statute allowing the cross-
examination of an adversary does not allow the questioning to
include matters in violation of the right against adverse testimony
of the other spouse.96 The Minnesota court has rejected the argu-
ment that the husband and wife statutory marital privileges were
affected by the statute allowing cross-examination of the adver-
sary.
97
D. Comment on Failure to Call Spouse
When the defendant in a criminal prosecution refuses to allow
his wife to testify, he is not required to state the grounds for his
refusal.98 However, even though the defendant notifies the prose-
cuting attorney that he intends to assert the privilege, it is not im-
proper for the prosecutor to request the testimony at trial. ' Prej-
udice to the defendant may be avoided by the lower court's in-
structing the jury that the objection to the testimony of the spouse
should not be considered against the defendant.1 9 In one case, a
defendant's failure to call his wife as a witness was commented
upon in the prosecutor's closing argument, and the court expressed
its disapproval of such tactics, though under the defendant's theory
of defense it did not consider the comment reversible error.101
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE PRIVILEGES
Critics of the privilege to exclude testimony for or against the
spouse have assigned numerous reasons for its abrogation. They
point to other infringements upon domestic tranquility not pre-
vented by the privilege, resulting from contradictory testimony
by spouses in actions between third persons 0 2 or from the testimony
of children or brothers and sisters. 03 Furthermore, economic and
social changes have somewhat lessened the physical unity of the
home,0 4 and the changed concept of the family is said to render the
privilege an anachronism.9 3 The current high divorce rate is ad-
95. Minn. R. Civ. P. 43.02 (1952), formerly covered by Minn. Stat. §
595.03 (1949).
96. See Lloyd v. Simons, 90 Minn. 237, 244, 95 N. IV. 903, 906 (1903).
97. Ingersoll v. Odendal, 135 Minn. 428, 162 N. IV. 525 (1917) ; see
Wolford v. Farnham, 44 Minn. 159, 165, 46 N. W. 295, 297 (1890).
98. See State v. Kampert, 139 Minn. 132, 139, 165 N. W. 972, 975
(1918).
99. State v. Roby, 128 Minn. 187, 150 N. W. 793 (1915).
100. See id. at 192, 150 N. W. at 795.
101. State v. Kampert, 139 Minn. 132, 165 N. W. 972 (1918).
102. Hutchins and Slesinger, supra note 1, at 675.
103. Id. at 677.
104. Id. at 677-678.
105. 8 Wigmore, Evidence 232; Hines; Privileged Testinony of Hus-
band and Wife in California, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 390, 407 (1931).
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vanced as being illustrative of the de-emphasis of connubial con-
cord.-' Also, it is contended that the benefits of the privilege are
largely conjectural, whereas the exclusion of the evidence is a
definite loss. 0
7
However, in many families and homes the presence of marital
confidence and harmony may not be as illusory as supposed by
the adversaries of the privilege. To require one spouse to testify
against the other would clearly often strain domestic felicity. A
great number of legislatures and courts, including WMinnesota's, 05
have concluded that requiring adverse testimony would be detri-
mental to society. Perhaps a re-examination of the utility of the
privilege would be valuable, however, and assistance may be pro-
vided by the experience of those states which have abolished the
privilege altogether.""
The privilege to exclude privileged communications is said to
be largely unknown to laymen and not relied upon, so it is con-
tended that its abolition would work no hardship. 10 Also, whether
the benefit from the privilege outweighs the injury is claimed to
be speculative,"' though Wigmore disputes this and asserts that
confidence is essential to the marital relation and should be pro-
moted by the courts."12 There is clearly more justification for re-
taining this privilege than the privilege against adverse testimony.
Other matters which the legislature might profitably consider
and clarify include the question whether the communicating spouse
is the only one who may claim the privilege or whether the com-
municatee may also invoke it. Another area warranting reconsidera-
tion is whether the witness spouse should be specifically granted a
privilege to refrain from testifying against the party spouse irre-
spective of the latter's consent or objection. Granting such a privi-
lege would avoid placing the witness spouse in the position where
he must either commit perjury or incriminate the other spouse." 3
106. Hutchins and Slesinger, supra note 1, at 678.
107. Id. at 675; see also 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 589.
108. Miinn. Stat. § 595.02 (1949), State v. Feste, 205 Nfinn. 73, 285
N. AV. 85 (1939).
109. See 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 584-586; 8 Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 2245. The privilege is also abolished in England. Ibid.
110. 3 Vernier, American Family Laws 589; Hines, supra note 105, at
413; Hutchins and Slesinger, supra note 1, at 682.
111. Hines, supra note 105, at 412-413; Hutchins and Slesinger, supra
note 1, at 682.
112. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2332.
113. See text at V., B. supra.
